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When Is Growth at Risk? 
ABSTRACT   This paper empirically evaluates the potentially nonlinear 
nexus between financial indicators and the distribution of future GDP growth, 
using a rich set of macroeconomic and financial variables covering thirteen 
advanced economies. We evaluate the out-of-sample forecast performance 
of financial variables for GDP growth, including a fully real-time exercise 
based on a flexible nonparametric model. We also use a parametric model to 
estimate the moments of the time-varying distribution of GDP and evaluate 
their in-sample estimation uncertainty. Our overall conclusion is pessimistic: 
moments other than the conditional mean are poorly estimated, and no predictors 
we consider provide robust and precise advance warnings of tail risks or indeed 
about any features of the GDP growth distribution other than the mean. In 
particular, financial variables contribute little to such distributional forecasts, 
beyond the information contained in real indicators.
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Following the Great Recession, there has been an increasing interest in understanding the relationship between financial fragility and the busi-
ness cycle. Having failed to predict the crash, the economics profession has 
been trying to understand what was missing in standard macroeconomic 
models and what are the key indicators of stress in financial markets which 
may help forecast crises and identify the build-up of macroeconomic risks 
ahead of time. The research agenda involves not only prediction but also 
a revisitation of the earlier literature on financial frictions and the busi-
ness cycle, pioneered by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), on the basis of the 
experience of the 2008 Great Recession.
This research goes beyond academia since it is potentially informative 
for macroprudential policy, which indeed focuses on the interaction between 
financial institutions, markets, and the wider economy. Such policies need 
to be grounded in theoretical and empirical knowledge of what are the 
appropriate tools for strengthening the resilience of the financial system to 
macroeconomic shocks and vice versa. Early warnings of growth fragility 
would allow monetary and fiscal policymakers to respond proactively to 
budding crises.
The structural literature has focused on two alternative classes of 
variables: those capturing the effect of an external financial premium (in 
line with models based on the financial accelerator) and those capturing 
balance sheet constraints such as household or bank credit, reflecting the 
idea that leverage is a main indicator of the accumulation of financial 
instabilities (Gertler and Gilchrist 2018). Price variables such as credit 
spreads are typically used as proxies for the external financial premium. 
In fact, there is some consensus that measures derived from different 
types of interest rate spreads can have predictive power for future eco-
nomic conditions. For the United States, for example, the influential 
work of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) has proposed a measure of an 
excess bond premium that has been widely adopted in both academic 
and policy work.
A different but related line of research, pioneered by the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS), has stressed the importance of the leverage 
cycle as an indicator of risk and used excess private credit as a measure 
of macrofinancial imbalances (Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 
2010). Some studies have pointed at a correlation of excess growth in 
leverage and financial crises (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2011, 2013; 
Schularick and Taylor 2012) and found that recessions preceded by financial 
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crises are deeper and followed by slower recoveries (Reinhart and Rogoff 
2009; Valencia and Laeven 2012).1 However, this literature is mainly 
concerned with long-term features of the nexus between finance and the 
macroeconomy and on financial crises rather than recessions. At business 
cycle frequency, growth rates of credit aggregates are found to be pro-
cyclical and lagging (Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin 2019). In a recent 
paper, Brunnermeier and others (2019) have pointed out that credit moves 
passively with output but that the negative correlation between credit 
spreads and output is mostly explained by the endogenous response of 
monetary policy.
Although the literature is very rich, few robust results have emerged 
from empirical studies about the extent to which financial variables can 
be used to predict economic activity. This confirms the conclusions of 
earlier work (Stock and Watson 2003; Forni and others 2003; Hatzius and 
others 2010). In particular, three features of financial variables provide 
challenges to probing both the predictive and the causal relationships 
connecting them to the real variables. First, movements in financial vari-
ables are largely endogenous to the business cycle. Second, the dynamics 
of financial variables—and spreads in particular—are potentially nonlinear 
and may be related to the higher moments of the GDP distribution rather 
than just the central tendency. Finally, there is a great degree of hetero-
geneity among financial indicators. Different types of financial variables 
capture different mechanisms through which financial markets and the 
macroeconomy interact.
The idea that financial and economic conditions may be correlated non-
linearly has recently inspired a line of research which uses nonparametric 
methods in order to study the predictive distribution of GDP and its 
evolution in relation to financial conditions. Giglio, Kelly, and Pruitt (2016) 
and Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019a) estimate the predictive 
GDP distribution conditional on a synthetic index of financial conditions. 
This index aggregates variables capturing financial risk, leverage, and 
credit quality. For the United States, such an index is constructed by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago—the National Financial Conditions 
1. A related but different line of research has identified a financial cycle with different 
characteristics than the business cycle but leading it and found that financial cycle booms 
either end up in crises or weaken growth (Borio and Lowe 2002; Drehmann, Borio, and 
Tsatsaronis 2012; Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 2012).
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Index (NFCI). Both papers, focusing on US data, found that the lower 
quantiles of GDP growth vary with financial conditions while the upper 
quantiles are stable over time, therefore pointing to an asymmetric and 
nonlinear relationship between financial and real variables. New research is 
building on these ideas. Recent contributions are by Kiley (2018), Adrian, 
Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019b), Loria, Matthes, and Zhang (2019), 
Brownlees and Souza (2019), and Figueres and Jarociński (2020).
As proposed by Adrian and others (2018), the evaluation of the predic-
tive GDP distribution can be used to define the concept of growth at risk, 
defined as the value of GDP growth at the lower fifth percentile of the 
predicted growth distribution, conditional on an index of financial stress. 
This concept has been adopted by policy institutions in many different 
countries to monitor risks.2 The appeal of this approach to policy work, 
in particular macroprudential, is that it provides a framework in which 
forecasting can be thought of as a risk-managing exercise.3
The value of this framework for policy in practice rests on whether 
the dynamics of the moments of the conditional distribution of GDP 
can be captured with some degree of precision and on whether there 
is some out-of-sample predictability for moments other than the mean. 
In a recent paper, Reichlin, Ricco, and Hasenzagl (2020) evaluate the 
out-of-sample performance of an aggregate indicator of financial stress 
and of some key financial variables for the GDP distribution, using the 
nonparametric approach of Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019a), 
and found little evidence of predictability beyond what can be achieved 
using timely indicators of the real economy. In this paper we broaden 
this analysis in several directions by asking three questions.
First, we want to assess the marginal role of financial variables in 
estimating and predicting the conditional distribution of GDP once we 
condition appropriately on available monthly macroeconomic information. 
Our conjecture is that monthly macroeconomic and financial variables 
co-move strongly at the contemporaneous level and that a large part of 
what is revealed by the NFCI reflects some joint information. This of 
course would not be the case if financial markets primarily reflected 
forward-looking information, a feature which cannot be assumed and must 
be tested.
2. See, for example, Prasad and others (2019) for a description of the use of this method 
at the IMF.
3. See Greenspan (2004) and Kilian and Manganelli (2008).
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Second, we want to evaluate whether nonlinearities in the predictive 
distribution can be effectively exploited for forecasting and whether the 
dynamics of moments other than the mean can be precisely estimated. 
We believe that both evaluations are important for understanding whether the 
growth-at-risk framework can be used in practice for macroprudential policy. 
The out-of-sample evaluation takes into consideration overall uncertainty: 
stochastic, estimation, and model uncertainty. Parameter uncertainty—that 
is, uncertainty conditional on a particular assumed model—can be evalu-
ated in-sample. For the first purpose we use the nonparametric method 
proposed by Giglio, Kelly, and Pruitt (2016) and Adrian, Boyarchenko, and 
Giannone (2019a), while for the second purpose we use a fully parametric 
implementation of their approach. The motivation for using two different 
models is that the nonparametric approach very flexibly captures non-
linearities without relying on particular functional forms, but, unlike the 
parametric method, it cannot easily be used to assess the statistical uncertainty 
surrounding the estimation of the moments of the growth distribution. 
We view the two approaches as complementary.
Third, we assess the potentially different roles of individual financial 
variables in estimating the moments of the conditional distribution by 
considering a variable selection algorithm. The motivation here is that— 
as has been observed by Reichlin, Ricco, and Hazenzagl (2020)—financial 
variables have very different dynamic properties so that, by aggregating 
predictors into financial and real indexes as done in the literature, some 
information can be lost. An approach that allows individual variables to 
enter the model in a flexible way may therefore be of interest. Moreover, 
understanding which specific economic variables carry information about 
the distribution of GDP growth would allow policymakers and academics 
to hone in on specific mechanisms of growth fragility. We consider both US 
data and a panel of twelve other Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries. This allows us to consider more than a 
few recessionary events in our sample. For the United States, for which 
we have a richer data set, we perform the analysis both separately and in 
combination with other countries’ data.
The overall conclusion of our analysis is pessimistic on the ability of the 
data to tell us something more than the evolution of the conditional mean. 
All other time-varying moments are imprecisely estimated. Moreover, 
both the out-of-sample analysis and the in-sample results point to very 
little additional predictive power of financial variables for other moments 
and for all moments at longer horizons. This remains true in a real-time 
nowcasting exercise where we take into account the timeliness of financial 
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variables relative to other data, since survey data are almost as timely and 
highly correlated with macroeconomic data. Finally, when single variables 
are allowed to enter into the model flexibly, these results are confirmed for 
both credit spreads (prices) and credit aggregates (quantities), although 
our methods cannot rule out that some interaction between spreads and 
credit is at work.
In section V, we run the real-time experiment over the recent COVID-19 
lockdown episode in the first months of 2020. In this case, the model with 
financial variables does provide a more timely indication of the directional 
movement of the GDP growth distribution, relative to models that only 
condition on nonfinancial data. However, no model gets close to accurately 
predicting the severe magnitude of the downturn. Moreover, the COVID-19 
episode has no bearing on the question of whether financial variables are 
helpful predictors outside very short forecast horizons.
At a more general level, our analysis confirms the older literature’s 
results of the lack of predictive power of financial variables for the real 
economy, but we show that this finding carries over to an approach that in 
principle is capable of capturing nonlinearities and tail risks. Our findings 
suggest that markets do not anticipate the timing of the recession and they 
price the risk only once they see it. In other words, the onset of a recession 
comes as a surprise to seemingly all agents in the economy. This blindness 
can be interpreted as revealing that information is rapidly available to all, 
but rare events such as recessions are fundamentally unforecastable. Impor-
tantly, our results do not imply that macroprudential policy should give up 
on limiting the accumulation of financial fragilities, since it is likely that 
those fragilities amplify the damage to the real economy once recessions 
do occur. However, this is not a question that we can evaluate using the 
methods in this paper.
The sections of the paper are organized around the questions we ask. 
After presenting some motivating facts in section I, section II asks the 
question of whether financial variables have specific forward-looking infor-
mation that can inform an out-of-sample predictive relationship with the 
mean or higher moments of the GDP distribution. We also assess whether 
financial variables have predictive power for the GDP distribution during 
the nowcasting period, where we consider their timeliness advantage 
with respect to real economic indicators. Section III asks how precisely 
the moments of the predictive distribution of GDP growth, conditional on 
real and financial factors, can be estimated in-sample. As in section II, we 
use as predictors both a global factor that includes joint real and financial 
information and a financial factor that includes the financial information 
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orthogonal to the global factor. Section IV abandons the factor-based pre-
dictors and instead asks whether there are any specific individual economic 
variables that are able to explain the dynamics of GDP growth moments. As 
a case study, we evaluate the nowcast of the GDP growth distribution in the 
recent COVID-19 lockdown episode in section V. Section VI concludes.
I. A Few Motivational Facts
In this section we present a few facts that motivate the analysis of the paper.
I.A.  Fact 1: Economic Fluctuations Are Asymmetric  
over the Business Cycle
Figure 1 shows that the distribution of US GDP growth exhibits some 
skewness and fat tails. The figure plots the histograms of annual real GDP 
growth over the samples 1959:Q2–2019:Q3 and 1984:Q1–2019:Q3 and 
the associated fitted distributions. The dark area marks the overlapping 
segments. Growth in both subsamples exhibits skewness and heavy tails, 
although arguably to varying degrees. Indeed the literature has suggested 
that recessions can be described as a combination of a negative first-moment 
Sources: FRED-QD and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Histograms of annual real GDP growth over the samples 1959:Q2–2019:Q3 and 1984:Q1–
2019:Q3. The fitted distributions are computed by adopting the flexible skew t-distribution developed by 









Figure 1. Annual Real GDP Growth
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(mean) shock and a positive second-moment (uncertainty) shock (Bloom 
2014) or as negative third-moment (skewness) shocks (Bloom, Guvenen, 
and Salgado 2019), and fat tails have been found to be a feature of GDP 
distribution in many advanced economies (Fagiolo, Napoletano, and 
Roventini 2008).
This fact motivates an analysis which is based on estimation and fore-
casting of moments other than the mean of the predictive GDP distribution.
I.B.  Fact 2: Financial Condition Indicators and Spreads  
Are Highly Negatively Correlated with Output Growth  
at the Time of Recessions
Figure 2 shows a clear negative correlation between spreads and GDP 
growth around recessions (although the relation is unstable over the 
sample). The figure plots quarterly annualized GDP growth for the period 
from 1973:Q1 to 2016:Q3 against three credit spreads that have been 
considered in the literature as measures of financial risk (Gilchrist and 
Zakrajšek 2012).
This chart suggests that the asymmetry in the business cycle for output 
growth is associated with the asymmetry in the behavior of credit spreads. 
Sources: FRED-MD, FRED-QD, and Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012).
















Figure 2. Financial Stress Indicators and GDP Growth Rates
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The latter increase sharply in coincidence or just prior to an economic 
contraction, while there is no symmetric movement in these variables 
during booms. The intriguing suggestion is that, by conditioning on these 
variables, it would be possible to capture higher moments of the GDP 
conditional distribution. As discussed above, this idea has been the inspira-
tion for the literature that has explored the predictive power of financial 
variables for moments other than the mean, which we seek to evaluate in 
this paper.
I.C.  Fact 3: Movements in Financial Conditions Are  
Largely Endogenous and Related to Output Growth
Financial time series and macroeconomic variables share a pronounced 
contemporaneous common component. Figure 3 reports the quarterly 
average of the monthly NFCI and of a business cycle index computed from 
a large set of monthly macroeconomic indicators.4
The two synthetic aggregate indicators of financial and macroeconomic 
variables exhibit a very clear pattern of co-movement. The strong correlation 
emerging from the plot indicates that movements in financial indicators are 
possibly endogenous and contemporaneous to business cycle fluctuations.
This fact suggests that, in order to establish the role of financial variables 
for predicting the GDP distribution, one should control for the common and 
contemporaneous component (what we define as the “global factor”) and 
focus on the additional “marginal” information available in the financial 
indicators (the “financial factor”). This is what our analysis will do.
I.D.  Fact 4: Different Types of Financial Variables Have  
Heterogeneous Dynamics along the Business Cycle
Figure 4 provides a more disaggregated view of financial stress by 
plotting the NFCI and its components. The chart suggests that the NFCI 
4. The business cycle index is computed as the first common factor to all of the variables 
in the FRED-MD data set, except the ones classified as financial. Online appendixes S.A and 
S.B provide details on the estimation of the factor. The NFCI index is a synthetic indicator 
computed as a common factor extracted from 105 mixed-frequency—weekly, monthly, 
and quarterly—financial variables. It averages four categories of data: credit quality, risk, 
nonfinancial, and financial leverage. All variables are transformed to stationarity and stan-
dardized. For a description of the NFCI (variables considered and methodology), see Brave 
and Butters (2012) and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s dedicated website: https://
www.chicagofed.org/publications/nfci/index. Both factors are estimated by maximum likeli-
hood following Doz, Giannone, and Reichlin (2012) and averaged across quarters. Table S.4 
in the online appendix S.D reports the full set of estimated values for the model coefficients.
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The chart plots an index of real activity extracted as a common factor from a large set of 
macroeconomic variables and excluding financial variables against the NFCI. The time sample is 
1973:Q1–2016:Q3.










Figure 3. Business Cycle and Financial Condition Indexes
Source: FRED-QD.















Figure 4. Heterogeneous Dynamics of Financial Indicators
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aggregates components with heterogeneous dynamic characteristics, poten-
tially reflecting different forms of fragility in the financial system. It shows 
that the aggregate NFCI dynamics reflect mainly the risk and credit com-
ponents, while nonfinancial leverage follows a smoother cyclical pattern, and 
financial leverage exhibits some higher-frequency idiosyncratic dynamics.
Indeed, different indicators of stress capture different aspects of financial 
frictions, which may be relevant at different moments in time—either 
preceding, contemporaneous to, or following the financial crisis.5
This fact motivates our analysis of the role of individual variables in 
predicting the moments of the conditional distribution of GDP growth.
II. Predicting Growth at Risk
In this section we assess whether financial variables aggregate forward-
looking information that helps predict the distribution of future GDP growth. 
In particular, we are interested in teasing out information about the future 
path of output and its moments in excess of the contemporaneous infor-
mation provided by other macroeconomic indicators. Toward this aim, 
we consider the marginal gain in the predictive distributions for GDP growth 
(and its moments) when financial-specific information is incorporated, 
relative to baseline models that only condition on the global common 
component in real and financial data.
We provide both an out-of-sample exercise—forecasting one quarter 
and four quarters ahead—and a fully real-time monitoring of risks to GDP 
growth with a realistic data release calendar, encompassing macroeconomic 
and financial variables. It is worth observing that the out-of-sample exercise 
provides an overall summary of the performance of the model by factoring 
in several types of uncertainty, excluding the uncertainty about data itself 
that is a component of the flow of revised data releases. The real-time 
exercise takes the latter dimension of uncertainty partially into account 
since it is based on a realistic calendar of data releases mimicking the 
information flow.
The results are overall negative. The inclusion of financial-specific 
information does not improve the mean squared forecast error of the model, 
nor does it help capture the dynamics of any of its moments. However, 
financial variables appear (very marginally) to help in pinning down the 
common contemporaneous information in real time.
5. See Bernanke (2018) for an analysis of the 2008 recession in the United States.
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II.A. The Evolution of Out-of-Sample Growth Movements
We first ask the following questions: How do the moments of the 
predictive distribution vary over time? Do financial variables capture shifts 
in the predictive mean, variance, or higher moments of the GDP distribu-
tion? Is it possible to predict an increase in GDP growth vulnerability out 
of sample? This exercise focuses on short-to-medium horizons and tries to 
gauge the overall abilities of the models in assessing risks to GDP growth. 
Importantly, while providing an assessment of the models’ performance 
against the several sources of uncertainty—stochastic, estimation, and model 
uncertainty—it abstracts from the data uncertainty that characterizes data 
releases in real time. We integrate this last source of uncertainty in the 
subsequent real-time exercise.
DATA AND MODEL The first step in our exercise is the estimation of 
common factors from a large panel of variables. Specifically, we extract 
two indexes of commonalities. The first factor, which we refer to as the 
global factor, is common to all the variables in the McCracken and Ng 
(2016) Federal Reserve Economic Data Monthly Database (FRED-MD) 
data set, including real, financial, monetary, and price variables. The second 
factor, which we refer to as the financial factor, is only common to the 
financial variables and is by definition orthogonal to the global factor. 
Figure 5 plots the two factors over the sample period. Online appendix S.A 
provides details on the factor models adopted to estimate the factors.6 
Table S.1 in online appendix S.B provides details on the data set and 
on the assumptions adopted to estimate the factors.
The key difference from the analysis of Adrian, Boyarchenko, and 
Giannone (2019a) is that, while they adopt the NFCI as the main indicator 
of financial conditions, we separate the information contained in the global 
factor and the orthogonal financial factor. Reichlin, Ricco, and Hasenzagl 
(2020) observe that the NFCI is largely endogenous to economic conditions 
in the United States and that it has high correlation with a factor extracted 
from nonfinancial variables only (as also shown in figure 3). This observation 
motivates our choice to adopt a global indicator of economic conditions 
as well as a financial-specific factor that could, in principle, capture inde-
pendent forward-looking information about the moments of the predictive 
distribution of GDP growth that is not obtainable from current economic 
conditions.
6. Figure S.1 in online appendix S.C reports the estimated loadings for the factor model 
with a global factor and a financial factor.
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We employ the factors as predictors in the nonparametric quantile 
regression framework of Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019a). 
To compare the predictive content of the two factors, we consider three 
empirical specifications. We model annualized cumulative GDP growth at 
the one-quarter-ahead and four-quarter-ahead horizons as being driven by, 
respectively,
(model 1) GDP growth at time t;
(model 2)  GDP growth at time t and the economic activity global factor 
at time t; and
(model 3)  GDP growth at time t and both the global and the financial 
factors at time t.
We first estimate the factor model using data from 1975:Q2 to 1984:Q1. 
We then iteratively estimate the predictive distributions of GDP growth 
one and four quarters ahead, expanding the estimation sample, one quarter 
at a time, until the end of the sample in 2019:Q3. In every quarter of the 
out-of-sample period, we apply the nonparametric prediction approach of 
Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019a). This involves first estimat-
ing the relationship between the percentiles of future GDP growth and the 
predictors using quantile regressions. Then we smooth out the predictive 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The time sample is 1975:Q2–2021:Q3. The values between 1975:Q2 and 2019:Q3 are in-sample 
estimates of the factors and the values between 2019:Q4 and 2021:Q3 are out-of-sample forecasts.








Figure 5. Global and Financial Factors
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distribution by fitting a flexible family of distributions to the estimated 
conditional percentiles, allowing for both skewness and heavy tails. The 
details of the prediction procedure are described in online appendix S.A.
RESULTS Regardless of the predictors used, the models fail to provide 
noticeable advance out-of-sample signals of the likelihood or severity 
of recessions. Figure 6 shows the first four moments of the forecast 
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Note: Time evolution of the four moments of the one-quarter-ahead predictive distribution of GDP 
growth, from 1984:Q1 to 2019:Q3, for three models: including the global factor, financial factor, and 
GDP; including the global factor and GDP; and GDP only.
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Figure 6. Out-of-Sample Forecasts: Time Evolution of the Predictive Distribution  
of GDP Growth
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distribution of GDP growth at horizons h =  1 and h =  4. By breaking down 
the predictive distribution into different moments, we aim to show what 
features of the distribution of GDP growth are predictable, if any. The figure 
compares three models: one that includes the global factor, the financial 
factor, and GDP; one that includes the global factor and GDP; and one that 
includes lagged GDP only.
At the one-quarter-ahead horizon (h =  1) shown on the left, the distribu-
tions of both models that incorporate factors show a sharp decrease in the 
mean around the period of the Great Recession, but importantly, the model 
incorporating the financial factor does not seem to have an informational 
advantage. Strangely, the model not incorporating the financial indicator 
seems to capture an increase in the variance related to the Great Recession, 
albeit with some delay. In fact, the movement in the variance lags the 2008 
recession by a few quarters, and it results from the incorporation into the 
model, with a quarter of delay, of the spike in spreads in the fourth quarter 
of 2008. Also, the increase is not remarkable when compared to the level of 
the forecast variance in the 1990s. Skewness and kurtosis apparently move 
over the sample but with patterns that are not easy to interpret or to relate 
to economic contractions.
At the four-quarter-ahead horizon (h =  4) shown on the right, the findings 
are in line with those discussed for h =  1 but the reactions to contractions 
are even more delayed. Interestingly, only the model with the global 
factor forecasts substantial contractions in GDP at the four-quarter horizon 
around recessionary periods, although with long delay. Higher moments 
do not exhibit interpretable patterns. This raises doubts about the ability 
of the models to correctly capture the dynamics of these moments, at least 
out-of-sample, an issue we will return to in section III.
We now zoom in on the Great Recession period. Figure 7 reports the 
two predictive distributions at different points in time (2007:Q4–2009:Q1), 
for h =  1 and h =  4, before and during the Great Recession for the three 
different models. None of the models seem to predict the crisis. At horizon 
h =  1 (the set of graphs on the left), all the models fail to capture the 
onset of the economic downturn in 2008:Q1, and they all assign a low 
probability to it. As financial stress spikes up in the fourth quarter of 
2008, the conditional forecast of both models that include the global factor 
fans out, attaching higher likelihood to a wider range of events. At horizon 
h =  4 (the set of graphs on the right), all models seem to do equally poorly 
in capturing the shift in economic conditions. Although the model that only 
conditions on lagged GDP performs particularly poorly, the two models 
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incorporating factors yield very similar predictive distributions. Indeed, the 
model that also incorporates financial variables seems to have little infor-
mational advantage.
A more systematic evaluation of the distributional forecast accuracy by 
analyzing the models’ predictive scores confirms the minuscule predictive 
content of the financial factor. This is shown in online appendix S.D in 
figure S.2. The predictive score is high if a model attaches a high likelihood 
to the value of GDP growth that is actually realized (see the formal defini-
tion in online appendix S.A). While at h =  1 the two models have nearly 
indistinguishable predictive scores, at h =  4, the model incorporating the 
financial factor seems to have a very small advantage over the model with 
the global factor only. Yet its performance does not uniformly dominate the 
























































Note: Quarter-by-quarter evolution of the predictive distributions in the period of the Great Recession, 
from 2007:Q4 to 2009:Q1, for three models: including the global factor, financial factor, and GDP; 
including the global factor and GDP; and GDP only. The charts report also the realization of annualized 
GDP growth one and (cumulatively) four quarters ahead, respectively.
Global/financial/GDP Global/GDP GDP only
Figure 7. Out-of-Sample Forecasts: Predictive Distributions during the Great Recession
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SUMMARY An explorative out-of-sample analysis indicates that financial 
variables help only very marginally in improving the performance of 
a model that already includes a real activity indicator, computed as the 
common factor of a large panel of real macroeconomic variables. Inter-
estingly, the movements in higher moments of the forecast seem not to be 
very informative.7 In particular, skewness and kurtosis do not show any 
interpretable movement around recessions. This suggests that growth 
vulnerability is a story about the mean and possibly volatility of growth, 
rather than about time variation in the probability of extreme events. We 
return to this issue in section III, where we will be able to characterize the 
statistical uncertainty associated with the estimation of each time-varying 
moment. In the next subsection we explore the specific informational 
content of financial indicators and their relations with real variables, their 
timeliness, and the heterogeneity across financial variables.
II.B. Real-Time Monitoring of Risks to Growth
To assess the predictive ability of the quantile regression model in real 
time, we turn to nowcasting, that is, predicting the current quarter value 
of GDP growth (h =  0). We will also continue to consider the one-quarter-
ahead forecast horizon (h =  1). Although these horizons are too short-term 
for the practical implementation of macroprudential policies, they are 
relevant for prediction since the literature has shown that, generally, there 
is very little predictability for the mean of GDP growth beyond one quarter 
(Giannone, Reichlin, and Small 2008). Additionally, monetary and fiscal 
policy may be able to respond within the quarter in some cases. Finally, 
our results so far seem to indicate that the model has limited predictive 
ability at longer horizons anyway.
DATA AND MODEL In this exercise we update the factors and hence the 
forecast and nowcast in relation to a calendar of data releases, in the tradi-
tion of the nowcasting literature. First, we construct a set of real-time data 
vintages from the Archival Federal Reserve Economic Data (ALFRED) 
database. The data series that we include were chosen to closely resemble 
the FRED-MD data set, given data availability constraints of the real-
time data. The real-time vintages for some variables only become available 
after the beginning of the forecasting exercise. Those variables are added 
to the exercise once they become available. As we did above, we extract a 
number of common factors from those vintages. Beyond the global factor 
7. This is consistent with the findings of Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019a).
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(common to all the variables) and the financial factor (common to the 
financial variables only and orthogonal to the global factor), we also 
consider a nonfinancial factor, computed from the subset of the data set that 
excludes financial variables.
The calendar of data releases uses the average release lag for each 
variable. In the out-of-sample exercise, we then iterate over the release 
calendar, position ourselves at each release date, and perform the following 
two-step procedure:
(step 1)  We estimate the factors using an expectation-maximization 
(EM) algorithm. Then we average the monthly factors to get 
quarterly factors.
(step 2)  We apply the nonparametric forecast approach of the previous 
subsection to quarterly data up to the current quarter. Using this 
approach, we construct predictive distributions for current quarter 
and next quarter GDP growth.
We consider the following three sets of predictor variables:
(model 1) global factor only;
(model 2) global factor and financial factor; and
(model 3) nonfinancial factor only.
We construct quarterly versions of the factors as averages of the factors 
estimated in a monthly nowcasting model (Giannone, Reichlin, and Small 
2008). We begin the out-of-sample forecasting exercise in 2005:Q1. For each 
data release we estimate the factors and the quantile regression parameters 
using an expanding data set starting in 1980:Q1.
Some of the financial variables included in our real-time exercise—
stock indexes, oil price, exchange rates, interest rates, and spreads—are 
available at daily or higher frequency. However, they enter the model only 
as end-of-the-month values on the first day of the following month. This, 
while being a blunt approximation of the information flow, still affords 
these financial variables an informational advantage by including them in 
the model before any real and nominal variable, for the month of interest. 
Table 1 shows the average lag of the release of the most important groups 
of variables that we use in the exercise. Table S.1 in online appendix S.B 
shows all the variables included in the data set, their average release lag, 
and the factors on which they load. By employing the growth-at-risk frame-
work, our methodology also allows for financial variables to affect higher 
moments of the GDP forecast, which could be particularly important in 
determining tail risks.
Comparing the short-term forecasting performance of a model that 
contains only the global factor and a model that contains both the global 
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and financial factors allows us to study the additional information content 
of financial variables over and above what is common to all the other 
economic variables. Additionally, comparing the short-term forecasting 
performance of the model that contains only the nonfinancial factor helps 
assess the effects of financial variables on imputing the global factor.
RESULTS Financial variables help only very marginally for nowcasting, 
and only because they help to estimate the global factor more precisely. 
Figure 8 reports the evolution over time of the four moments of the 
predictive growth distribution at horizon h =  0. The top panel shows that 
the conditional means of the predictive distributions in all models are 
nearly identical. The global factor captures the co-movement between all 
variables, including the financial variables, and adding the orthogonal 
financial factor does not have a substantial effect on the mean of the pre-
dictive distribution. The model with the factor estimated using only non-
financial variables provides a forecast for the mean that is nearly identical 
to that of the other models.
The models disagree more about the variance, skewness, and kurtosis 
of the predictive distributions. For example, in the middle of the Great 
Recession, the model with the financial factor shows an increase in kurtosis 
in 2008 and a spike in skewness early in 2009. While these features are 
not prominent in the sample, they may be an indication that the real-time 
model that incorporates financial variables captures some downside risks 
to growth, although with a delay.
Figure 9 shows that the early availability of financial variables does not 
translate into more accurate forecasts of the mean of the GDP distribution 
at short horizons. The top chart reports the root-mean-square forecast error 
of the three models, which depends only on the mean of the predictive 
Table 1. Groups of Variables Used in the Nowcast Exercise and Their Release Lags
Variable group Release lag
Stock indexes, exchange rates, interest rates, and spreads  1
Institute for Supply Management indexes  1
Employment and earnings  5
Monetary aggregates 15
Industrial production and subcomponents 16
CPI, producer price index, and subcomponents 16
Housing starts, housing permits, and subcomponents 18
Personal consumption expenditure and real personal income 30
Sources: Archival Federal Reserve Economic Data (ALFRED) and authors’ calculations.
Note: The lag variable is the approximate number of days between the last day of the reference month 
and the date at which the variable becomes available.
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Time evolution of the four moments of nowcast predictive distribution of GDP growth at h = 0 
of quantile regressions with the global factor only, with the global and financial factors, and with the 
factor estimated using only nonfinancial variables, from 2005:Q1 to 2019:Q3.
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Figure 8. Nowcast of the Moments of GDP Growth
distributions, as a function of the remaining time until data on GDP growth 
is released. We make the following observations: First, the root-mean-
square forecast errors of all three models are on a slightly downward-
sloping path throughout the forecasting period. This indicates that the data 
released over the forecasting period marginally improve the forecasting 
performance of the model. Second, the root-mean-square forecast errors 
of models 1 and 2 are nearly identical, which indicates that including the 
orthogonal financial factor into the model does not improve the ability to 
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forecast the mean of the growth distribution. Third, although the financial 
variables could in principle still help by providing timely information about 
the global factor, this contribution is only marginal, as is evident by com-
paring the root-mean-square forecast errors of models 1 and 2 (which use 
financial data) to model 3 (which does not). This is also apparent from the 
bottom chart, which shows the predictive scores of the three models. This 
measure accounts for the accuracy of the entire predictive distribution of 
GDP growth, not just the mean. Only an ever so slight improvement of the 
forecasting performance of models 1 and 2 (which use financial data) over 
model 3 (which does not) is noticeable.
SUMMARY Our out-of-sample test of the predictive ability of a now-
casting model in which we augment the standard global factor with an 
orthogonal financial factor reaches a disappointing conclusion: the perfor-
mance of the model with both the global and financial factor is largely 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Both charts show the values over the 2005:Q1–2019:Q3 sample, averaged over the distance to 
the release date of GDP.
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Figure 9. Nowcast Evaluation
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indistinguishable—in terms of root-mean-square forecast error and 
predictive score—from a model with only the global factor. The inclusion 
of financial variables into the global factor does lead to a small improve-
ment in predictive score relative to a model with only a nonfinancial factor. 
This is probably due to the timeliness of financial variables, which can 
provide marginally earlier updates to the expected path of GDP growth at 
very short horizons.
III.  How Does the Distribution of GDP Growth Change  
over Time?
The previous section demonstrated that there may be some limited out-of-
sample information about the time-varying forecast distribution of GDP 
growth, although most of the predictive information comes from a global 
factor, not specifically financial variables. However, the method used 
there did not allow us to quantify the uncertainty surrounding any putative 
time variation in the conditional moments. In this section, we estimate a 
full statistical model of post-1975 US GDP growth that allows conditional 
moments to vary flexibly over time. Crucially, we will be able to quantify 
the uncertainty about the parameters in the model and thus the implied 
uncertainty about the evolution of the conditional moments of GDP growth. 
Unlike the previous section, we focus on in-sample results in this section. 
Thus, the only uncertainty is about the parameters of the model, which is 
assumed to be correctly specified. Even then, we find that the data are only 
informative about the conditional mean; the time variation of the condi-
tional variance and higher moments is very imprecisely estimated. As a 
result, the time variation in the conditional recession probability and in the 
potential severity of recessions is driven almost exclusively by movements 
in the mean.
III.A. Data and Model
We model quarterly GDP growth as being driven by lagged GDP 
growth, as well as the global and financial factors estimated in section II. 
We use the final estimates of these factors. In this section we merely use 
these factors as a convenient set of low-dimensional explanatory variables, 
whereas the next section will attempt to attribute any explanatory power to 
individual variables with more direct economic interpretation. The sample 
period for estimation is 1975:Q2–2019:Q2. Online appendix S.E runs 
various benchmark linear forecast regressions using the global and financial 
factors. These benchmark regressions reveal that both factors potentially 
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could contribute to the mean forecasts, at least in sample. However, we are 
primarily interested in going beyond the mean.
We assume that the one-quarter-ahead conditional distribution of GDP 
growth is given by the flexible skew t-distribution developed by Azzalini 
and Capitanio (2003). The distribution is indexed by four parameters: 
location µ, scale σ, shape α, and heavy-tailedness ν. These parameters 
influence—but do not directly equal—the conditional mean, variance, 
skewness, and kurtosis of the distribution. If α =  0, the distribution reduces 
to the usual symmetric Student’s t-distribution with ν degrees of freedom, 
which in turn reduces to the normal distribution when ν approaches ∞. 
If α >  0, the distribution is positively skewed, while α <  0 implies the 
opposite. Smaller values of ν correspond to fatter tails of the growth distri-
bution (higher probability of abnormally low or high growth).
To allow the explanatory variables to influence several features of the 
GDP distribution, we model the location parameter µ =  µt, the logarithm of 
the scale parameter log σ =  log σt, and the shape parameter α =  αt as being 
time-varying. These parameters are each assumed to depend linearly on an 
intercept, lagged GDP growth, and the lagged global and financial factors. 
The heavy-tailedness parameter ν is constant over time. This parameter 
mainly influences the kurtosis of the conditional growth distribution, and 
we will show below that there is little information in the data about time 
variation in higher moments anyway. We apply a Bayesian estimation 
procedure with weakly informative priors on the parameters.
The model and estimation procedure are described in detail in online 
appendix S.A. As discussed in the appendix, our model can be viewed as 
a fully Bayesian implementation of the estimation approach developed 
by Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019a) and used in section II. 
An advantage of our approach is that we can easily summarize the posterior 
uncertainty about time-varying parameters and moments.
III.B. Time Variation in US Moments and Tail Risk
Figure 10 shows that the data are only able to accurately pin down the 
time variation in the mean of the one-quarter-ahead conditional distribution 
of GDP growth. The standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the 
forecast distribution are much less precisely estimated. The figure shows 
the posterior median and 90 percent credible interval for the moments at 
each point in time. The uncertainty is due to the fact that the underlying 
model parameters are estimated with varying degrees of precision in the 
post-1975 data. As is clear from the figure, the implied uncertainty about 
higher moments is large. Although the posterior median of the conditional 
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standard deviation does fluctuate, quarters with potentially large swings 
are also associated with high uncertainty. The time paths of skewness 
and kurtosis are even more imprecisely estimated. Figure S.6 in online 
appendix S.F shows that all these results are qualitatively unchanged 
when we look at the conditional moments of the four-quarter-ahead fore-
cast distribution.
How does the uncertainty about higher moments affect inferences about 
the left tail of the growth distribution? The top chart in figure 11 shows 
the time-varying implied one-quarter-ahead conditional probability of a 
Sources: FRED-QD, FRED-MD, and authors’ calculations.
Note: Time-varying moments of the one-quarter-ahead forecast distribution of GDP growth (annualized). 
The thick line is the posterior median (across parameter draws) at each point in time. The gray shaded 
band is the pointwise 90 percent posterior credible band (across parameter draws) at each point in time. 
The time axis shows the quarter in which the forecast is made.
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Figure 10. US Factor Model: Time-Varying Moments, One Quarter Ahead
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recession (that is, negative growth in the following quarter). We see that 
the recession probability varies substantially over time and is reasonably 
precisely estimated. However, this is purely due to movements in the 
conditional mean of next-quarter GDP growth, as opposed to movements 
in the other moments. The second chart in the figure shows the conditional 
probability of GDP growth falling below the conditional mean; this prob-
ability does not vary much over time and is imprecisely estimated. The 
third chart in the figure shows the 5 percent expected shortfall, which is a 
Sources: FRED-QD, FRED-MD, and authors’ calculations.
Note: Recession probability, probability of growth below the conditional mean, expected shortfall, and 
expected shortfall minus conditional mean for the one-quarter-ahead conditional distribution of GDP 
growth (annualized). The thick line is the posterior median (across parameter draws) at each point in 
time. The gray shaded band is the pointwise 90 percent posterior credible band (across parameter draws) 
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Figure 11. US Factor Model: Recession Probability and Expected Shortfall,  
One Quarter Ahead
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measure of the severity of a recession should it materialize (specifically, 
it equals expected growth conditional on growth falling below the fifth 
percentile of its conditional distribution). The expected shortfall moves 
around over time, but the fourth chart—where the conditional mean has 
been subtracted—shows that this movement is almost entirely due to 
movement in the mean. We report analogous results for four-quarter-ahead 
forecasts in online appendix S.F; these are qualitatively similar.
Thus, there appears to be little exploitable time variation in the condi-
tional GDP growth distribution apart from the mean. Although knowing the 
conditional standard deviation and higher moments would be very helpful 
for characterizing the risks to GDP growth, it appears that the available 
data for the United States are simply not sufficiently informative about 
these moments. On the positive side, movements in the conditional mean 
do appear to be partially predictable, at least in sample. Note that if we are 
interested in estimating the probability of recessions, and we shut down 
movement in all moments except for the mean, our model reduces to 
a probit forecasting model, which is a commonly used specification in 
applied work.
The financial factor contributes very little to the growth forecasts, 
whereas the global factor plays a larger role for the conditional mean. 
Online appendix S.F shows the posterior distribution of the model coeffi-
cients. The mean coefficients on both factors are statistically significant at 
conventional levels, but the coefficient on the global factor is estimated 
to be larger in magnitude. In the appendix we also investigate how the 
time-varying forecast moments shown in figure 10 change if we remove 
the global factor or the financial factor from the conditioning set when 
producing forecasts. Removing the financial factor has almost no discern-
ible effect on any of the moments, whereas removing the global factor does 
lead to substantial changes in the path of the conditional mean, especially 
around the Great Recession period. Thus, as in the out-of-sample results 
in the previous section, the orthogonal financial factor plays a very minor 
role in short-term forecasting even in sample.
Figure 10 suggests that the unconditional skewness of US GDP growth 
is indistinguishable from zero, but this result masks a subtle feature of 
the posterior distribution of the underlying model parameters. In online 
appendix S.F we show that the marginal posterior distributions for the 
intercepts in the equations for the scale parameter σt and shape parameter αt 
both exhibit a marked bimodality. These two parameters are highly nega-
tively correlated in the posterior. In essence, the data cannot distinguish 
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whether US GDP growth features either a low mean but positive skewness 
or a high mean but negative skewness. Notice that this is not a state-
ment about variation in skewness over time, but simply a statement about 
posterior uncertainty about the nature of the unconditional GDP growth 
distribution. However, we show in online appendix S.F that if the model 
is estimated on the post-1980 sample, the positive skewness mode dis-
appears. Figure 2 shows that US GDP growth was especially erratic in the 
late 1970s, and indeed growth from 1975 to 1979 has a positive sample 
skewness. Yet the post-1980 data point quite clearly toward negative uncon-
ditional skewness. We return to the estimation of unconditional skewness 
and kurtosis in section IV.
CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE The fact that time variation in moments other 
than the mean is imprecisely estimated holds up in data for other OECD 
countries. We relegate the discussion of the cross-country data set to the 
next section, where these data are used more intensively. We estimate 
a global and financial factor separately for each of twelve other OECD 
countries, using the same method as we used for the United States. Online 
appendix S.F shows the estimated time-varying forecast moments for 
Australia, Italy, and Japan, which are representative of the other countries. 
In all cases, the conditional mean of GDP growth is estimated quite pre-
cisely, but posterior uncertainty about the model parameters translates into 
substantial uncertainty about the time paths of the conditional standard 
deviation, skewness, and kurtosis.
SUMMARY When using lagged GDP growth, a global factor, and a finan-
cial factor as predictors, it appears to be highly challenging to accurately 
estimate the time variation in the conditional variance, skewness, and 
kurtosis of GDP growth. The conditional mean, however, is reasonably 
precisely estimated, and it does appear to vary substantially over time. 
This is true in data for the United States and for other OECD countries. 
Hence, at least if we ignore out-of-sample forecasting issues, GDP growth 
forecasting is not a completely futile exercise at short horizons—though 
all the action is in the mean and none in the tails. More generally, our 
results demonstrate the importance of taking parameter uncertainty into 
account when making inferences about rare events from relatively short 
time series.
However, because we focused on factors as predictors, it remains 
a possibility that individual economic variables might provide strong 
signals about risks to GDP growth. We turn to this question in the 
next section.
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IV. Which Variables Predict Growth Risk?
Do real activity and financial conditions indexes represent the best way 
to predict and describe growth vulnerability? Policymakers and academics 
alike may additionally be interested in which specific economic variables 
carry the most predictive power, for several reasons. First, when designing 
macroprudential policies or when explaining such policies to the public, 
it would be useful to know the most important economic predictor variables, 
narrowly defined. Second, financial indexes—such as the NFCI used by 
Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019a)—are usually not constructed 
to explicitly optimize the ability to forecast tail risk in GDP growth. 
Thus, it is possible that additional predictive power can be gleaned from 
considering predictor variables individually. Finally, detailed results 
on the performance of individual predictor variables may shine light on 
mechanisms that can guide theoretical model building.
In this section we complement the factor-based analysis of section III 
by performing a variable selection exercise to find those specific eco-
nomic time series that best forecast various moments of GDP growth. 
We do this by estimating a conditional heteroskedasticity model and the 
dynamic skew-t model considered in the previous section on US and 
cross-country data sets, with a wide array of candidates for predictor 
variables. Rather than focusing directly on tail risks, we break down our 
results by the conditional moments of GDP growth, since this sheds more 
light on potential mechanisms. Our fully Bayesian approach allows us 
to describe the uncertainty surrounding the variable selection. For sim-
plicity and clarity, we restrict attention to one-quarter-ahead forecasting 
in this section.
Relative to the literature, our contribution here is to select individual 
variables—among a large set of candidate variables—that predict GDP 
growth, its volatility, and higher moments, in data for the United States and 
for twelve other OECD countries. In contrast to the multicountry analyses 
of Adrian and others (2018) and Brownlees and Souza (2019), our focus 
is on variable selection and on characterizing cross-country heterogeneity 
in growth dynamics. Unlike these papers, we do not explore the role of the 
forecast horizon.
IV.A. Data
We employ two different data sets: a quarterly US data set and a multi-
country data set for thirteen OECD countries. In addition to GDP growth 
(the outcome variable), both data sets contain an extensive set of possible 
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predictor variables. The US data set is especially rich and extends back to 
1975, while the predictors in the multicountry data set are slightly more 
limited in scope and extend back to 1980.
The quarterly US data set is based on the Federal Reserve Economic 
Data Quarterly Database (FRED-QD) data set constructed by Michael W. 
McCracken and Serena Ng, building on earlier work by Stock and Watson 
(2012).8 This data set is frequently used for high-dimensional prediction in 
macroeconomics due to its broad scope, reliable data quality, and ease of 
availability. We select series from various categories of real, price, and 
financial variables. Though the selected financial series do not cover the 
full universe used to construct the NFCI, we do include corporate spreads; 
government bond yields; credit and loan volume; federal, corporate, and 
household balance sheet variables; stock price and dividends; implied vola-
tility; and exchange rates. We supplement with data from Global Financial 
Data, Inc., and Haver Analytics on commodity prices; consumer, business, 
and purchasing manager surveys; and stock trading volume. This yields a 
total of forty-three predictor variables.
The multicountry data set covers thirteen OECD countries, with up to 
thirty-four predictor variables for each country. As in the US data described 
above, the potential predictor variables include a variety of real, price, 
survey, and financial variables. Our overarching goal is to ensure that 
variable definitions and samples are comparable across countries, so that 
any cross-country heterogeneity can be interpreted in a straightforward 
way. The thirteen countries are Australia (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada 
(CAN), Switzerland (CHE), Germany (DEU), Spain (ESP), France (FRA), 
the United Kingdom (GBR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), the Netherlands 
(NLD), Sweden (SWE), and the United States (USA).9 Our primary data 
source is the OECD Economic Outlook and Main Economic Indicators 
databases. We supplement with data from the BIS on house prices and 
credit, financial data from Global Financial Data, Inc., and household and 
business surveys from Haver Analytics.
Exploiting data from several countries could in principle ameliorate the 
inevitable data limitations when estimating the effect of financial indica-
tors on real growth vulnerability (Adrian and others 2018). According to 
Carmen Reinhart’s classification, the United States has undergone only 
8. See the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, https://research. 
stlouisfed.org/econ/mccracken/fred-databases/.
9. Adrian and others (2018) consider the same countries, excluding Belgium and the 
Netherlands.
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two banking crises since 1980: the savings and loan crisis in the late 1980s 
and the global financial crisis of 2007–10.10 However, every year from 1980 
to 2014, with the exception of 2002–06, has witnessed a new or ongoing 
banking crisis in at least one of the thirteen countries in our data set. If we 
include currency crises in the calculation, only the years 2004 and 2006 
were crisis-free in all thirteen countries. In an average year, 3.7 countries 
experience a crisis (standard deviation 2.7). From 1980 to 2016 there have 
been a total of ninety-nine country-years of banking crises and forty-seven 
country-years of currency crises for the countries in our data set ( just nine 
country-years experienced both types of crisis at once).
The full list of all US and multicountry predictor variables (and their 
abbreviations) can be found in online appendix S.B.
To make coefficients comparable across different predictor variables, 
we standardize all predictors (but not GDP growth) to have sample mean 
zero and variance 1, separately for each country.
IV.B. Which Variables Forecast Growth and Its Volatility?
We first attempt to identify important predictors of the mean and volatility 
of GDP growth. We will initially restrict attention to a more parsimonious 
version of the dynamic skew-t model from section III. Specifically, we 
assume that only the mean and variance can vary over time, shutting 
down any potential time variation in higher moments. This conditional 
hetero skedasticity model was also analyzed by Adrian, Boyarchenko, and 
Giannone (2019a).
Because we are interested in selecting the relevant predictor variables 
among a large set of candidates, we employ a Bayesian prior distribu-
tion on the model parameters that imposes approximate sparsity, that is, 
it prefers parsimonious (and thus interpretable) models. Specifically, we 
impose the “horseshoe prior” of Carvalho, Polson, and Scott (2010), which 
essentially assumes that the coefficients on the various predictors are 
either relatively small or relatively large. The practical consequence of 
imposing this prior is that the posterior distribution will shrink many of 
the coefficients heavily toward zero, thus yielding a parsimonious model. 
However, the coefficients on those predictors that are most informative 
in the data will be shrunk very little. Since we continue to adopt a fully 
10. See the data set collected by Carmen Reinhart and colleagues, Harvard Business 
School, Behavioral Finance and Financial Stability, https://www.hbs.edu/behavioral-finance-
and-financial-stability/data/Pages/global.aspx.
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Bayesian approach to inference, it is easy to quantify the uncertainty about 
the parameters in the model. We give further details about the estimation 
procedure in online appendix S.A.
RESULTS: US DATA We first estimate the model on the quarterly US data set 
from 1975:Q2 to 2019:Q2. Lagged GDP growth turns out not to be espe-
cially important for either the conditional mean or volatility, conditional on 
the other predictor variables discussed below. Hence, we report the results for 
the lagged growth coefficients and the intercepts in online appendix S.G.
Mean forecasting. Which variables help predict the mean of GDP 
growth? Figure 12 shows the posterior densities for the mean predictor 
coefficients. Recall that all predictors have been standardized, so that the 
magnitudes of different coefficients are immediately comparable. About 
a third of the variables are found to have high posterior probability of 
being at least somewhat economically important. There is especially high 
posterior probability of inventories (INVENTO) being an economically 
important predictor of the mean of GDP growth, with statistically significant 
roles also played by disposable income (DISPINC), employment (EMPL), 
new housing permits (HOUSEPERMIT), house prices (HOUSEPRICE), 
and imports (IMPORT).
The only two financial variables that have a high probability of being 
important for the mean are implied volatility (VXO) and the spread 
between AAA corporate bonds and ten-year Treasuries (AAASPR). Perhaps 
surprisingly, the coefficient on the term spread (TERMSPR) is estimated 
to be small. There is only weak evidence that credit aggregates may play 
some role, although business loans (LOANSCORP), business net worth 
(NWCORP), and household net worth (NWHH) cannot be entirely ruled out.
Volatility forecasting. When it comes to volatility forecasting, there 
is strong evidence of predictive power for only a few variables. Figure 12 
shows the posterior densities of the volatility coefficients. The coefficient on 
the AAA corporate bond spread (AAASPR) has substantial posterior mass 
at values in the range [−0.3, −0.1] (the posterior median is −0.16), indicating 
that a ceteris paribus one standard deviation increase in this spread is asso-
ciated with a 10–30 percent increase in GDP growth volatility, a potentially 
substantial effect. Yet the bimodal nature of the posterior density reflects 
the fact that the data, combined with our prior belief in sparsity, cannot 
entirely rule out that even this coefficient may be close to zero.
None of the other predictor variables are unambiguously important 
for volatility forecasting. Other than the AAA spread and lagged GDP 
growth, no coefficient has a posterior median greater than 0.05 in magni-
tude. There are five other variables for which the posterior probability of 
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their coefficients exceeding 0.05, or being below −0.05, lies in the range 
30–50 percent: business condition surveys (ECONSENT), housing starts 
(HOUSESTART), and industrial production (INDPRO) all possibly have 
a negative association with volatility, while the S&P 500 dividend yield 
(DIVYIELD) and unit labor cost index (ULC) possibly have a positive asso-
ciation with volatility. Of these variables, the one with the highest degree 
of posterior certainty is industrial production, for which the posterior 
probability of lying below −0.05 is a modest 48 percent.
RESULTS: CROSS-COUNTRY DATA Are the predictors of GDP growth and its 
volatility robustly identifiable across several developed countries? Estimat-
ing the conditional heteroskedasticity model separately on thirteen OECD 
countries from 1980:Q1 to 2018:Q4, we find that the answer to this question 
is a resounding no.
Mean forecasting. Although we found encouraging in-sample results 
on mean forecasting in US data, the precise identities of the relevant 
predictor variables appear to be highly heterogeneous across the thirteen 











































































































































































































Figure 12. US Conditional Heteroskedasticity Model Posterior Densities
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OECD countries. Table 2 shows summary statistics of the posterior distri-
butions of the mean predictor coefficients across countries. Other than 
lagged GDP growth, only the national stock index (STOCKPRICE) is 
significant at the 50 percent level for more than half the countries (in the 
sense that the posterior interquartile range excludes zero). The coefficients 
on consumer sentiment (CONSSENT) and the manufacturing production 
index (MANUF) also have posterior probability greater than 20 percent 
(on average across countries) of being larger than 0.1, meaning that a 
one standard deviation increase is associated with 10 basis points higher 
quarter-on-quarter GDP growth. Other than the stock index, no other finan-
cial variables seem important for more than a few countries, including 
various financial spreads and credit aggregates.
Figure 12. US Conditional Heteroskedasticity Model Posterior Densities (Continued)
Sources: FRED-QD; Global Financial Data, Inc.; Haver Analytics; and authors’ calculations.
Note: Posterior densities of the coefficients on mean and variance predictor variables in the conditional 
heteroskedasticity model. Vertical dashed lines indicate posterior interquartile ranges. A coefficient value 
of 0.1 means that an increase in the predictor by one standard deviation is associated with a 0.1 percentage 
point increase in the conditional mean of quarter-on-quarter GDP growth (left, p. 32) or with a 10 percent 
increase in the conditional volatility of quarter-on-quarter GDP growth (right, above).
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Table 2. Cross-Country Conditional Heteroskedasticity Model: Posterior of  
Mean Coefficients
Average across countries
Variable # a Medianb Signif c P >  .1d P <  –.1d
CA 13 –0.0006 0.08 0.01 0.01
COMMCRB 13 0.0055 0.15 0.03 0.00
CONSGOVT 13 –0.0054 0.08 0.00 0.03
CONSPRIV 13 0.0289 0.23 0.15 0.00
CONSSENT  7 0.0245 0.43 0.17 0.00
CREDCORP 13 0.0019 0.08 0.03 0.02
CREDCORPBNK 13 –0.0052 0.08 0.02 0.04
CREDHH 12 0.0024 0.00 0.04 0.01
DIVYIELD 13 –0.0178 0.31 0.01 0.11
ECONSENT  6 0.0067 0.33 0.06 0.01
EMPL 13 0.0296 0.31 0.15 0.00
EXCHEFF 13 –0.0003 0.00 0.01 0.01
EXCHUSD 12 –0.0081 0.08 0.02 0.05
EXPORT 13 0.0063 0.08 0.05 0.01
GDPDEF 13 0.0010 0.15 0.01 0.01
HOURS 12 0.0126 0.08 0.07 0.00
HOUSEPERMIT  6 0.0261 0.33 0.14 0.00
HOUSEPRICE 13 0.0211 0.46 0.11 0.00
HOUSESTART  8 0.0102 0.13 0.06 0.01
IMPORT 13 0.0155 0.23 0.10 0.00
INTRBNKRATE 13 0.0003 0.00 0.01 0.01
INVESTM 13 0.0227 0.38 0.15 0.03
MANUF 13 0.0497 0.38 0.21 0.00
PMI  1 0.0079 0.00 0.07 0.00
RETAIL 12 0.0011 0.17 0.02 0.02
STOCKPRICE 13 0.0352 0.54 0.20 0.00
STOCKRV 13 –0.0007 0.00 0.01 0.02
STOCKVOL 10 0.0081 0.20 0.06 0.00
TERMSPR 13 0.0072 0.23 0.05 0.01
TERMTRADE 13 0.0032 0.08 0.02 0.01
ULC 12 0.0010 0.25 0.05 0.02
UNRATE 13 –0.0103 0.23 0.00 0.08
VXO 13 0.0015 0.00 0.01 0.01
YIELDSPRUS 12 –0.0039 0.08 0.00 0.03
YLAG 13 0.1449 0.77 0.59 0.13
Sources: OECD; BIS; Global Financial Data, Inc.; Haver Analytics; and authors’ calculations.
Note: Summary statistics of the mean coefficient posterior distributions for thirteen OECD countries.
a. Number of countries present in the data.
b. Posterior median of coefficient.
c. Indicator for whether posterior interquartile range for coefficient excludes zero.
d. Posterior probability that coefficient is >  .1 or <  −.1, respectively.
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Volatility forecasting. Cross-country heterogeneity is even more per-
vasive in volatility forecasting. Table 3 shows summary statistics of the 
posterior distributions of the volatility predictor coefficients across coun-
tries. The only volatility predictor variable that is significant at the 50 per-
cent level for more than five countries is the term spread (TERMSPR). 
Turning to economic significance, it is only the coefficients on S&P 100 
implied volatility (VXO, an international variable) and on lagged GDP 
growth itself (YLAG) that have a nonnegligible posterior probability of 
being larger than 0.05 in magnitude for more than a handful of countries. 
Recall that a coefficient magnitude of 0.05 means that a one standard 
deviation change in the variable predicts a 5 percent change in volatility, 
a modest amount.
Very few of the posterior medians of the volatility coefficients are 
economically significant, as shown in figure 13. The only three variables 
whose posterior medians are large in magnitude for two or more countries 
are stock prices (STOCKPRICE), S&P 100 implied volatility (VXO), and 
the ten-year government bond spread vis-à-vis the US (YIELDSPRUS). 
However, with the exception of VXO, the signs of the estimated effects 
of these variables differ across countries. If interest centers on specific 
countries, however, we do find strong evidence of substantial predictive 
power for a small number of additional variables, such as economic sentiment 
surveys (ECONSENT) and the term spread (TERMSPR) for the Netherlands, 
and house prices (HOUSEPRICE) for Japan.
SUMMARY We arrive at a negative conclusion: though it is possible to 
find strong evidence of a few important mean predictors and (less frequently) 
volatility predictors for individual countries—such as for the United States—
generalizing to other countries seems fraught with danger. There is little 
agreement across countries about the identity and sign of important mean 
and volatility predictors, despite our efforts to construct a data set with 
comparable variable definitions and data availability.
Contrary to the conjecture mentioned in section I that financial spreads 
and credit aggregates might carry different information about growth 
vulnerability, we do not find a robust role for either type of variable in mean 
or volatility forecasting. No financial variable in our data set plays a statisti-
cally and economically significant role in forecasting GDP growth at short 
horizons for more than a handful of the thirteen countries we consider. We 
stress, though, that our cross-country data set does not contain a measure of 
corporate borrowing spreads due to data availability. Thus, our analysis does 
not overturn the existing literature discussed in the introduction, although 
it does caution against putting too much faith in single-country analyses.
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Table 3. Cross-Country Conditional Heteroskedasticity Model: Posterior of  
Volatility Coefficients
Average across countries
Variable # a Medianb Signif c P >  .05 d P <  –.05 d
CA 13 –0.0073 0.31 0.06 0.17
COMMCRB 13 –0.0134 0.23 0.07 0.18
CONSGOVT 13 0.0031 0.00 0.11 0.05
CONSPRIV 13 0.0012 0.15 0.13 0.11
CONSSENT  7 –0.0159 0.14 0.04 0.27
CREDCORP 13 –0.0013 0.00 0.07 0.12
CREDCORPBNK 13 –0.0059 0.08 0.06 0.14
CREDHH 12 –0.0012 0.00 0.07 0.12
DIVYIELD 13 0.0018 0.00 0.11 0.05
ECONSENT  6 –0.0745 0.33 0.04 0.32
EMPL 13 –0.0010 0.00 0.08 0.11
EXCHEFF 13 0.0039 0.08 0.11 0.08
EXCHUSD 12 –0.0007 0.00 0.08 0.10
EXPORT 13 –0.0019 0.00 0.05 0.10
GDPDEF 13 –0.0008 0.08 0.07 0.07
HOURS 12 0.0073 0.25 0.13 0.11
HOUSEPERMIT  6 –0.0076 0.17 0.07 0.17
HOUSEPRICE 13 0.0064 0.23 0.11 0.14
HOUSESTART  8 –0.0051 0.25 0.06 0.14
IMPORT 13 0.0079 0.08 0.15 0.05
INTRBNKRATE 13 –0.0014 0.08 0.09 0.09
INVESTM 13 0.0017 0.00 0.09 0.08
MANUF 13 –0.0107 0.15 0.07 0.16
PMI  1 –0.0008 0.00 0.04 0.09
RETAIL 12 –0.0021 0.17 0.10 0.10
STOCKPRICE 13 0.0019 0.23 0.11 0.16
STOCKRV 13 0.0025 0.08 0.13 0.07
STOCKVOL 10 0.0010 0.20 0.11 0.11
TERMSPR 13 –0.0379 0.54 0.04 0.31
TERMTRADE 13 0.0106 0.15 0.14 0.07
ULC 12 0.0057 0.17 0.15 0.05
UNRATE 13 0.0106 0.08 0.15 0.07
VXO 13 0.0596 0.38 0.40 0.01
YIELDSPRUS 12 0.0321 0.42 0.25 0.12
YLAG 13 –0.0283 0.38 0.34 0.42
Sources: OECD; BIS; Global Financial Data, Inc.; Haver Analytics; and authors’ calculations.
Note: Summary statistics of the volatility coefficient posterior distributions for the thirteen OECD 
countries.
a. Number of countries present in the data.
b. Posterior median of coefficient.
c. Indicator for whether posterior interquartile range for coefficient excludes zero.
d. Posterior probability that coefficient is > .05 or < −.05, respectively.
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Sources: OECD; BIS; Global Financial Data, Inc.; Haver Analytics; and authors’ calculations.
Note: Each row in the plot corresponds to a variable, while the dots in each row correspond to different 
countries.
Figure 13. Cross-Country Conditional Heteroskedasticity Model: Posterior Medians  
of Volatility Coefficients
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IV.C. Which Variables Are Informative about Higher Moments?
Can we go beyond the mean or volatility and characterize the predictors 
of time variation in the skewness of GDP growth? To answer this question, 
we turn again to the full dynamic skew-t model described in section III, 
but instead of using a small number of factors as explanatory variables, 
we use our full set of individual economic predictor variables.11
In short, we find little robust evidence of individual predictors being 
informative about the time variation of skewness. In online appendix S.G 
we define a measure of the skewness of the forecast distribution with 
interpretable units, called “TVD.” This measure lies between zero and 1, 
with 1 indicating substantial skewness and zero indicating a symmetric 
distribution. Using this measure, we find that no predictor variable has an 
economically significant positive or negative effect on the time variation 
of skewness in more than a few of the countries in our analysis. The results 
are relegated to the appendix due to space constraints.
The distribution of GDP growth does exhibit clear unconditional 
skewness as well as moderate kurtosis in many countries. Table 4 displays, 
for each country, posterior summaries of αt, TVD(αt), and ν (Japan and 
Spain have been dropped from the analysis due to numerical convergence 
issues for these countries). Based on time-averaged TVD, most countries 
exhibit substantial skewness, as values of TVD around 25–40 percent 
indicate substantial departures from symmetry. From the time-averaged 
αt values it is clear, however, that the direction of skewness varies across 
countries: GDP growth tends to be negatively skewed in Switzerland, 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United States, and positively 
skewed in the other countries. As expected based on the above results, 
there does not appear to be substantial time variation in the extent of the 
skew, as can be seen by comparing the average and standard deviation of 
TVD over time within countries.12 As for kurtosis, all countries but the 
United Kingdom have posterior medians of ν in excess of 10, indicating at 
most moderately fat tails.
SUMMARY Skewness—and to a lesser extent fat tails—do seem to be 
pervasive features of the unconditional GDP growth distribution in many 
11. It turns out to be computationally difficult to impose a prior belief in sparsity in the 
full dynamic skew-t model, unlike in the conditional heteroskedasticity model considered in 
section IV.B. Hence, we here instead use conventional normal shrinkage priors. See online 
appendix S.A for details.
12. This is consistent with the conclusion of Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone 
(2019a, 1276), who however do not report measures of parameter uncertainty.
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countries, but attributing the time variation in these higher moments to spe-
cific interpretable economic variables appears challenging given available 
data. This echoes the result in section III, which used aggregated factors as 
predictor variables. In particular, corporate or household credit growth is 
not robustly associated with negative conditional skewness of GDP growth. 
Adrian and others (2018) find evidence for an interaction effect in cross-
country data: when credit growth is high, financial conditions are stronger 
predictors of risks to GDP growth at short horizons. Although we do not 
have explicit interaction terms in our model, the dynamic skew-t model 
can in principle generate this empirical pattern if credit growth negatively 
affects skewness while other financial variables affect the mean or variance 
of GDP growth. However, we do not find evidence for this mechanism 
in our data set. It is an interesting topic for future research to extend the 
dynamic skew-t model to allow for further state dependence.
V. Case Study: COVID-19
COVID-19 struck the world economy unexpectedly. A sharp recession 
in the United States, as in other parts of the world, was induced by the 
lockdown of a large part of the economy. Given the typical delay of macro-
economic information, it has been very difficult for traditional nowcasting 
and forecasting models to obtain meaningful numbers for the evolution of 
GDP in the first and second quarters of 2020. The most recent published 
Table 4. Cross-Country Skew-t Model: Unconditional Skewness and Kurtosis
Country Avg(α)a Avg(TVD)b Std(TVD)b Q1(ν)c Med(ν)c Q3(ν)c
AUS 5.224 0.387 0.087 12.0 18.0 26.7
BEL 1.747 0.311 0.092  7.6 13.0 21.6
CAN 0.472 0.273 0.101 12.0 18.3 27.4
CHE –0.821 0.243 0.081  8.5 13.0 20.2
DEU –5.574 0.363 0.093 13.5 20.1 29.4
FRA –0.160 0.248 0.100 12.0 18.2 26.9
GBR 1.578 0.307 0.107  4.5  7.1 12.5
ITA 4.229 0.369 0.089 12.8 19.4 28.5
NLD –4.719 0.392 0.087 10.9 16.7 25.4
SWE 2.381 0.331 0.114  6.5 10.0 16.2
USA –2.194 0.321 0.096 14.6 21.5 31.0
Sources: OECD; BIS; Global Financial Data, Inc.; Haver Analytics; and authors’ calculations.
Note: Unconditional higher moments of the GDP growth distribution, for eleven OECD countries.
a. Posterior mean of average (across time) of αt.
b. Posterior means of average and standard deviation (across time) of TVD(αt), respectively.
c. Posterior first quartile, median, and third quartile of ν, respectively.
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figure for first quarter growth is −4.8 percent, well below expectations. 
This provides a natural experiment for the analysis of this paper. Would 
the nowcast in real time have been more accurate in models that include 
financial variables?
Using the same nonparametric real-time estimation approach as in 
section II, we compute here the predictive distribution of GDP for the first 
and second quarters of 2020 and the first quarter of 2021. We condition 
on information available at three different dates: the first business days 
of February, March, and April 2020. It is important to notice that—apart 
from financial variables—no common business cycle indicators relating 
to the lockdown period were available until the end of April. However, 
news stories and policy discussion of the pandemic were rampant starting 
in January 2020, and this information could potentially have been reflected 
in asset prices, business and consumer surveys, and so on. We consider 
two models. The first includes the macrofinancial common factor (global 
factor) and the orthogonal financial factor (results are shown in figure 14, 
left side). The second model conditions on the nonfinancial factor only 
(figure 14, right side).
Figure 14 shows that financial variables do provide useful timely 
information about the COVID-19 downturn, although they react relatively 
late and severely undershoot the magnitude. The forecast distributions of 
GDP growth for 2020:Q1, 2020:Q2, and 2021:Q1 hardly move at all if 
we condition only on lagged GDP growth and the nonfinancial factor, even 
though in reality the economy contracted markedly in March. However, 
when conditioning on the global and financial factors, the predictive 
distributions for the first two quarters of 2020 and for one year ahead 
start moving to the left in the beginning of April. According to our data 
release calendar, and given the ad hoc convention that financial vari-
ables for March are released on April 1, at that date the only information 
available concerning March was financial data. At that time, surveys and 
macro variables were available only for January and February, before 
the lockdown went into effect. Thus, financial variables proved to be 
useful for nowcasting this particular episode. Notice, however, that none 
of the forecasts came close to predicting the actual scale of the downturn. 
Moreover, financial variables only started flashing warning signs in late 
February, mere days before dramatic policy actions were introduced in 
several US states.
Why did financial variables not similarly provide a timely warning in 
the early stages of the 2008–09 recession, as discussed in section II? The 
difference is that in January 2009 when the model updated the estimate for 
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2008:Q4, it could exploit information from both macro and financial data 
for October and November. These data points already signaled a fall in 
output. Hence, in this case the information from financial variables about 
December 2008 just served to confirm the negative signal, without provid-
ing truly novel information, unlike in the COVID-19 episode. In sum-
mary, this small COVID-19 case study suggests that financial variables 
can sometimes be useful timely indicators at short horizons when no other 
information is available from macroeconomic surveys and the like. More-
over, while financial variables correctly hinted at a directional movement in 
the GDP growth distribution, the actual forecast was still very poor relative 
Figure 14. Predictive Distributions of GDP Growth in the COVID-19 Crisis
















Global and financial factor Nonfinancial factor only
03-Feb-2020 02-Mar-2020 01-Apr-2020 Advance estimate








Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and authors’ calculations.
Note: Quarter-by-quarter evolution of the predictive distributions for the COVID-19 crisis, for the 
models including the global factor and the financial factor (left side), and the nonfinancial factor (right 
side). The charts for 2020:Q1 also report the BEA advance estimate of annualized GDP growth.
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to the realization. Thus, the conclusion of our analysis of the uncertainty 
surrounding forecasts of moments other than the mean, which we have 
provided in the previous sections, remains in force: one should not place 
too much confidence in the signaling ability of financial variables.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
The results presented in this paper indicate that financial variables have 
very limited predictive power for the distribution of GDP growth at short 
horizons, especially—but not limited to—the tail risk. Two factors drive 
these results.
First, moments other than the mean are estimated very imprecisely. 
Although our findings confirm that GDP growth in many countries exhibits 
a skewed unconditional distribution, it is very hard to precisely estimate 
the dynamics over time of variance, skewness, and kurtosis conditional on 
financial and macroeconomic variables. This implies that, when computing 
the probability of recessions from the estimated moments, we essentially 
obtain what we could have obtained by using a probit model. These results 
are true whether we allow individual variables to enter the model in a 
flexible way via a variable selection algorithm or we aggregate them 
as factors. The variable selection exercise does not point to any stable 
stylized facts, except for the finding that real indicators are selected more 
often than financial ones. While our results do not rule out a transmission 
of shocks from the level of variables to their variance and other moments, 
as sometimes postulated in stochastic volatility models, this mechanism 
is empirically tenuous.
Second, information in monthly financial variables is highly correlated 
with information in macroeconomic variables, especially in recessions, 
but the correlation is contemporaneous. As the economy enters a reces-
sion and we observe a fall in output, markets have a sudden change in 
sentiments which leads to a spike in the spread variables. A common factor 
extracted from financial and macro data usually predicts a fall in the mean 
of GDP during the onset of the recession, but no further predictive power 
is gained by adding an extra orthogonal factor capturing financial-specific 
information.
In our real-time nowcasting exercise, which takes into account data 
uncertainty and the release calendar of economic data, we showed that the 
timeliness advantage of financial variables is generally minuscule. The case 
study of the COVID-19 lockdown episode, however, shows that financial 
variables can in some unique instances provide early warning signs when 
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other macroeconomic data are not yet available. Still, even in this episode, 
models with financial data missed the severity of the downturn. Thus, 
the timeliness of financial information may help in real time but should 
not be overinterpreted, and financial markets do not seem to contain 
much forward-looking information about the macroeconomy beyond the 
current quarter.
The substantial cross-country heterogeneity in the identities of important 
predictor variables calls for humility in theoretical model building: the 
precise channels of the financial-real vulnerability nexus are difficult to 
tease out from the available data. In particular, it is likely a mistake to treat 
broad financial conditions indexes as catchall representations of any arbi-
trary financial friction that is of theoretical interest. Lack of predictive 
power might be the result of time instability between financial variables 
and GDP, which in turn may be caused by changes to the financial system 
and the conduct of monetary policy. This is something to be investigated 
further in future research.
Future research may also investigate whether our methods overlook 
state dependency and interactions between financial fragility and macro-
economic dynamics. For example, Krishnamurthy and Muir (2017) find 
that the interaction between credit spreads and precrisis credit growth can 
forecast the severity of the crisis. Aikman and others (2016) find that when 
private nonfinancial leverage is above trend, an easing of financial conditions 
predicts an economic expansion in the near term and a contraction in the 
following quarters. This is an interesting line of research which has impli-
cation for policy, as emphasized by Adrian and others (2018). It implies 
that although recessions are fundamentally unpredictable, prudential action 
can make the system less fragile so that, when they occur, the damage is 
limited. Although we do not directly investigate the role of such inter-
actions, our results at the very least suggest that empirical analysis of this 
phenomenon must be fraught with substantial estimation uncertainty.
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MARK GERTLER   This impressive paper examines the forecasting 
power of financial indicators for distribution of GDP growth. The moti-
vation for examining the distribution of GDP growth is that most major 
financial crises feature sharp nonlinear contractions in GDP. The question 
then arises as to whether financial indicators can provide an early warn-
ing of these economic disasters. Indeed, important recent work by Adrian, 
Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019) provides some hope that this may be 
the case. This work presents evidence that financial variables have predic-
tive power for the lower quantile of GDP growth, which the literature has 
termed “growth at risk.”
Perhaps not surprisingly the present paper provides a “forecaster’s per-
spective.” There is considerable emphasis on the statistical significance 
of the forecast. In addition, the authors focus on the marginal information 
that comes from financial variables, as I discuss shortly. Given the tough 
standards they apply, the authors show convincingly that financial variables 
do not provide significant marginal predictive power for the distribution of 
GDP growth.
In particular, the authors begin with time series of a large number of 
real and financial variables. They then proceed to construct two factors. 
The first is a global factor (GF) that characterizes common movements 
among the entire set of real and financial variables. Then from the finan-
cial variables alone they construct a financial factor (FF). The FF captures 
common movements in the financial variables that are orthogonal to the 
GF. In this respect, the FF isolates the marginal information from financial 
factors.
The authors then proceed to assess the predictive power of the FF for 
the distribution of GDP growth. Here they analyze both out-of-sample 
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forecasting and in-sample parameter uncertainty. There are two main find-
ings. First, it is difficult to predict moments other than the mean, even 
with the GF. Second, the FF adds little to the forecast. As a check against 
the possibility that the FF is an imperfect financial indicator, the authors 
extend the analysis to consider the forecasting power of individual finan-
cial variables. They find their result about lack of predictability of financial 
variables to be largely robust. One important exception, which I return to 
later, is that credit spreads provide helpful information for near term mean 
of GDP growth, consistent with results elsewhere in the literature.
TWO CLARIFICATIONS There are two aspects of the analysis that are help-
ful to clarify. First, the emphasis on the marginal information from finan-
cial variables is one important way the paper differs from earlier literature 
(and could account for some of the differences in findings). In contrast to 
Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019), the FF excludes the informa-
tion from the contemporaneous interaction between the financial and real 
sectors (contained in the GF). By doing so, the authors isolate information 
from financial conditions that is purely forward-looking. Given the objec-
tive of designing an early warning system, that is, a financial siren about 
risks to future growth that could go off independently of current economic 
conditions, the authors’ approach makes sense. However, as the authors 
clearly recognize, it is important to keep in mind that their forecasting 
exercise is silent on the importance of financial conditions for economic 
activity. Most of the theories of financial–real sector interactions they 
cite are based on contemporaneous mutual feedback, information that is 
excluded in their forecasting exercise.
Second, the use of an index for financial conditions that aggregates both 
credit prices and credit quantities is problematic. Credit prices and quanti-
ties differ in cyclical behavior. In particular, credit aggregates tend to oscillate 
at lower frequencies than spreads. As I show below, they also have a longer 
lead over real activity than do spreads. In addition, the economic interpreta-
tion of quantity and spread behavior can differ, as I also discuss below. In 
the end, aggregating credit quantity and price information makes the results 
difficult to interpret. The authors recognize this issue and, as I noted earlier, 
address it by also considering individual financial variables.
SOME PICTURES TO TELL THE STORY Figures 1 and 2 help illustrate the issues 
underlying the authors’ findings. Figure 1 portrays some basic features of 
a financial crisis based on evidence from Krishnamurthy and Muir (2017). 
The data are annual from a panel of industrialized economies from 1869 to 
1918. Each panel plots the average behavior of a variable before, during, 
and after the crisis. The upper right-hand panel shows that roughly three 
216 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2020
Figure 1. Behavior of Credit Spreads, GDP, and the Quantity of Credit
Source: Krishnamurthy and Muir (2017).
Note: This figure plots the behavior of credit spreads, GDP, and the quantity of credit around a 
financial crisis with the crisis beginning at time zero. GDP and credit are expressed in deviation from 
(country specific) trend. Spreads are normalized by dividing by the unconditional mean.























years prior to a crisis a credit boom emerges (typically associated with 
increasing asset prices). The upper left-hand panel shows that roughly two 
years later, on the eve of the crisis, credit spreads increase steadily and 
peak just following the crisis. From the lower panel, we see that there is 
a mild output boom entering the crisis followed by a sharp contraction. 
The figure clearly reveals nonlinear behavior of output in a financial 
crisis. It also shows the distinct patterns of credit aggregates and credit 
spreads. The former tend to exhibit a longer lead over the crisis than the 
latter. A natural interpretation is as follows. The buildup of credit (and 
leverage) increases borrowers’ vulnerability to negative shocks. When 
negative shocks (e.g., declining asset prices) eventually occur, borrower 
balance sheets weaken and financial distress emerges. Credit spreads 
reflect this distress. The important point to note is that while credit quantity 
and spreads play interrelated roles in the crisis, their timing and economic 
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relevance is distinct. For this reason, financial indexes that aggregate both 
types of variables may not provide the most efficient use of information.
Figure 2, taken from Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (forthcoming), 
illustrates why it may be difficult to find a reliable early warning signal of 
a financial crisis, despite the evidence in figure 1 that credit growth tends 
to lead crises by at least several years. The central identification problem is 
that there are “good” credit booms as well as “bad” ones, with the former 
being far more prevalent than the latter. The horizontal axis in figure 2 is 
demeaned credit growth for a country two years prior to current time. The 
vertical axis is demeaned credit growth one year prior. We can then define 
Source: Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (forthcoming).
Note: Run Frequency after boom: 4.9 pct.; After no boom: 2.8 pct.; (Boom: top right quadrant).









No crisis at t
Crisis at time t
Figure 2. Credit Booms and Financial Crises
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a credit boom as two years of above average growth, which corresponds 
to the upper right-hand quadrant in the figure. The diamond-shaped dots 
in the figure are times within a country where a crisis occurred. while the 
round dots are times absent a crisis. The key message is that conditional on 
a credit boom (i.e., conditional on being in the upper right-hand quadrant) 
crises occur only 5 percent of the time. That is, most of the time credit 
booms are good. It is true that a crisis is more likely conditional on boom. 
Conditional on no boom a crisis occurs with only 2.8 percent probability. 
The bottom line, however, is that credit growth is unlikely to provide a 
reliable early warning signal.
Credit spreads are likely a more reliable indicator than credit aggregates. 
However, as figure 1 shows, the lead time of a spike in spreads over a 
crisis is typically much shorter than that of credit growth. Thus, spreads are 
unlikely to provide a lengthy advance warning of the crisis. Nonetheless, 
the authors do present evidence that, for the near term, spreads help fore-
cast the mean of GDP growth, which is consistent with results elsewhere 
in the literature.
One caveat the authors note is that spreads do not provide information 
about the higher moments of GDP growth. Nonetheless, spreads may pro-
vide information about the depth of a recession. The reason is that spreads 
exhibit asymmetric positive jumps on the eve of crises that mirror the 
asymmetric declines in output, as figure 1 makes clear. A large jump in the 
spread prior to a crisis, accordingly, predicts a large drop in the conditional 
mean of output growth, everything else being equal.
A FEW THOUGHTS GOING FORWARD As the paper makes clear, a central 
challenge in forecasting the distribution of GDP growth involves data limi-
tations. There are simply not enough data to get statistical precision in the 
link between financial indicators and the higher moments of GDP growth. 
In the case of the United States, there has been only one major financial 
crisis in the postwar period (though that may change depending on how 
the current crisis plays out). To be sure, financial stress has occurred in 
previous downturns, but not on the same scale. One possibility, which the 
authors pursue at the end of the paper, is to exploit international data. The 
advantage, of course, is that they will gain more observations on financial 
crises. Here they find only very limited success: credit spreads are helpful 
in forecasting mean GDP growth (as noted earlier), but otherwise financial 
variables have little information content about GDP. As the authors note, 
though, more needs to be done to account for country heterogeneity.
It might also be useful to consider alternative financial indicators. For 
example, Krishnamurthy and Muir (2017) find success by interacting credit 
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aggregates with credit spreads. Another interesting possibility might be to 
disentangle unusual periods of high credit growth from normal periods of 
robust growth, as done by Hasenzagl, Reichlin, and Ricco (2020). Here, 
though, it might be necessary to make use of international data, given the 
limited number of such episodes in the United States.
BRIEF OBSERVATIONS ON FINANCIAL INDICATORS IN THE CURRENT CRISIS By 
mid-March, when it was obvious that the pandemic was going to have a 
clear economic effect, credit spreads increased sharply. The Baa corporate 
bond spread, as portrayed in figure 3, rose sharply from 200 basis points 
to nearly 425 basis points. This was below the peak of the Great Reces-
sion but at the same level at similar stages of the recession. Other financial 
indicators also pointed to distress, including plunging stock prices, various 
measures of liquidity in bond markets, and an increasing VIX. In this 
regard, financial variables were incorporating news of the contraction that 
would follow.
Were it not for an aggressive intervention in financial markets, finan-
cial market conditions would likely have continued to deteriorate sharply. 
Among other things, the Federal Reserve committed to buying high-grade 









Figure 3. Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield Relative to Yield on 10-Year 
Treasury Constant Maturity
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corporate bonds with the backing of the Treasury. In the period follow-
ing the announcement, corporate spreads have declined roughly 100 basis 
points and other financial distress measures have receded as well. For our 
purposes, the key lesson is that by (appropriately) taking action to reduce 
spreads the Federal Reserve has likely reduced the information content of 
this variable.
CONCLUDING REMARKS This paper makes a convincing case that the mar-
ginal information that financial variables have for the distribution of GDP 
growth is minimal. It is well executed and a very useful contribution to the 
forecasting literature.
As the authors would agree, though, lack of forecasting power is not 
the same thing as lack of importance for real activity. Much of the real–
financial interaction is contained in the contemporaneous interaction 
between real and financial variables, which is excluded from the authors’ 
definition of marginal financial information.
The key lesson for policy is that macroprudential policy should not 
be based on predictability. Rather, it should design the best response to 
unpredictable shocks that disrupt the financial system. This design, further, 
will most certainly depend on financial variables (e.g., bank leverage 
ratios, liquidity measures, etc.).
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COMMENT BY
NELLIE LIANG  This paper tackles two broad questions: Do financial 
variables have predictive value for GDP growth, and can higher moments 
of the GDP growth distribution be predicted? It is a forecasting paper, and 
it is extensive. The authors argue that financial variables have no predictive 
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power for GDP growth or risk to growth. But the paper misses the broader 
and more important relationship between the financial sector and real 
economy, which I discuss below and illustrate with the example of recent 
Federal Reserve actions in response to COVID-19.
I agree with the authors’ point that financial variables cannot be reliable 
predictors of a crisis, like one brought on by a pandemic or even the 2008 
global financial crisis. A crisis represents the product of a negative shock 
and vulnerabilities, which are amplifiers of shocks. To predict a crisis, finan-
cial variables would need to be able to predict both a negative shock and 
financial vulnerabilities. And they are not better at predicting a shock than 
any other variables.
But the message of the paper should not be that financial variables are 
not useful indicators of vulnerabilities in the financial sector because they 
can’t predict shocks. It would be a mistake to suggest that policymakers 
can ignore the effects of financial variables on the economy.
Financial stability reports of central banks are designed to guide macro-
prudential policies and to be inputs into monetary policy and emergency 
liquidity actions. The reports are very careful to say they cannot predict the 
next crisis, but they highlight the conditions that make the economy more 
prone to a crisis or deep recession because financial vulnerabilities are 
high and could amplify any unexpected negative shock through fire sales 
or contagion. Macroprudential policies aim to preemptively reduce finan-
cial vulnerabilities, like raising capital requirements for banks when credit 
is booming so that banks will have additional capital buffers to absorb 
higher future losses and be able to continue to provide credit should there 
be a negative shock. Indicators of financial vulnerabilities are financial 
variables, like asset valuations, credit burdens of borrowers, and leverage 
and funding risks of financial intermediaries. But in this paper the authors 
argue that financial variables have no predictive power and convey a 
message based on that narrow framing that they have no value for think-
ing about economic risks.
In its May 2020 financial stability report, the Federal Reserve high-
lights how some hedge funds and private mortgage funds quickly sold 
assets after asset prices fell in response to the spread of COVID-19. 
These sales contributed to unusual market dysfunction in the US Trea-
sury and mortgage-backed securities markets as bid-ask spreads widened 
and market depth shrank. Had financial regulators been willing or 
able to take more forceful macroprudential actions in recent years to 
limit the systemic consequences of leverage, liquidity risk, and model-
driven strategies of some private funds, the fall in asset prices brought 
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on by the pandemic (which could not be predicted) would not have been 
amplified to such an extent and could have limited purchases of Treasury 
securities and residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities by 
the Federal Reserve in March. (Those purchases were emergency liquidity 
actions, not quantitative easing or macroprudential actions.) The point is 
that financial vulnerabilities can have significant consequences for growth 
and risks to growth.
The authors argue that financial variables have no predictive power 
for GDP growth or risk to growth because “markets do not anticipate the 
timing of [a] recession and they price the risk only once they see it.” This 
statement highlights the framing of their empirical analysis, that financial 
variables are valuable only if they can predict shocks that can lead to 
recessions before real data can predict them. For several reasons and illus-
trated above with a specific example, I think the framing in the paper is 
too narrow. First, it ignores a more relevant question for financial policy-
making of whether financial variables affect risk-taking behavior of 
borrowers and lenders which lead to financial vulnerabilities. The impor-
tance of behavioral effects, indeed the endogeneity of financial variables 
and real activity, is a primary lesson of the global financial crisis and is 
core to macroprudential policymaking. That is, financial conditions can 
affect the buildup of financial vulnerabilities which can amplify large neg-
ative shocks, such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic. These amplification 
effects show through as financial market dysfunction and restricted credit 
supply which can separately increase risks to growth.
A second reason is that here the authors use a broad activity indica-
tor that includes both real and financial variables, as well as price and 
monetary policy variables, and then evaluates whether a separate finan-
cial variable constructed to be orthogonal to the broad indicator has addi-
tional predictive value. This unique construction leads to a financial factor 
that differs from most others and may be biased against finding value 
in financial variables leading to findings that seem to differ from those 
in a growing list of other studies. Third, when evaluating whether indi-
vidual indicators might be significant rather than indexes, the authors do 
not distinguish between types of financial variables. That is, the tests are 
horse races of variables without imposing any structure, which the authors 
acknowledge. But many papers find that the effects of different variables 
differ significantly, because funding risks will be different from the effects 
of credit risk and from the effects of financial intermediary risks.
In my discussion below, I focus on the results and interpretation related 
to forecasting the mean and variance of the US real GDP growth distribution 
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and interpret the results in terms of implications for macro prudential policy. 
The empirical results on skewness and kurtosis, as well as forecasts for 
other countries, do not change their broad conclusions.
To illustrate the issue of whether financial variables offer any additional 
information above the content in real activity variables, I estimate quantile 
regressions for GDP growth one quarter ahead on two indicators, an index 
of real economic activity (Chicago Fed National Activity Index, CFNAI) 
and a separate financial conditions index (NFCI). Both indexes are con-
structed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and allow the estimation 
period to start in 1975. In figure 1, I show the scatterplots of GDP growth 
one quarter ahead plotted, first, against the index of real economic activity 
and, second, against the financial conditions index. The lines in the plots 
are slopes of the quantile regressions. In contrast to ordinary least squares, 
quantile regressions minimize the absolute deviation rather than squared 
deviation of errors; this has the effect of weighting errors more heavily near 
the quantile of interest than errors that are further away.
As shown, the median quantile for GDP growth one quarter ahead for 
the real activity index (CFNAI) has a positive slope, and the slopes for the 
fifth percentile and the ninety-fifth percentile are similar, suggesting the 
variance is constant across different activity levels.
For the financial conditions index (NFCI), the slope of the median is 
slightly negative (tighter financial conditions in the current quarter, lower 
GDP growth in the next quarter). In contrast to the results for CFNAI, the 
slope of the fifth percentile is much more negative than for the median. 
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Figure 1. Quantile Regressions of GDP Growth on Real Activity and Financial  
Conditions Indexes
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These slopes are statistically different. They show the variance differs, 
although there clearly are fewer data points at higher levels of the NFCI, 
when they are tighter and GDP growth one quarter ahead is lower.
The next two charts in figure 2 illustrate the same relationships but are 
based on indexes now constructed so they are orthogonal to each other. 
The quantile regression slopes of the real activity index that is purged 
of the financial index and GDP growth one quarter ahead does not change. 
The slopes of the NFCI purged of the real index to GDP growth one quarter 
ahead also do not change much. The fifth percentile remains more nega-
tively related to financial conditions than the median, and the coefficients 
are statistically different.
These charts are a straightforward way to illustrate that financial vari-
ables do matter for variance once real activity variables are included. This 
real activity index does not include financial variables, and so a financial 
indicator orthogonal to the real index still has predictive value. In con-
trast, in this paper the authors use a global factor, which is common to all 
112 variables in the FRED-MD data set, which are real, price, monetary, 
and financial. The financial factor is constructed from the financial variables 
but also orthogonal to the global factor. A financial factor is then inter-
preted to be important only if it is important separately and in addition to 
its role in the global factor.
A number of studies other than Giglio, Kelly, and Pruitt (2016) and 
Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019), which the authors cite in the 
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Figure 2. Quantile Regressions of GDP Growth on Orthogonal Real and Financial 
Conditions Indexes
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paper, have found significant effects of various financial variables on GDP 
risk in the United States. For example, Coe and Vahey (2020) use non-
Gaussian and nonlinear estimations to predict risk to growth in the four 
crisis periods since 1875; Kiley (2018) uses quantile regressions to pre-
dict risks to the unemployment rate in the United States; Carriero, Clark, 
and Marcellino (2020a) and Caldara, Scotti, and Zhong (2020) use vector 
autoregression models with stochastic volatility to capture tail risks; and 
Carriero, Clark, and Marcellino (2020b) test a number of alternative models 
and show that a number of financial variables improve both point and tail 
risk nowcasts of GDP. Financial variables have been found to be significant 
for risk in other countries as well, in work by Chavleishvili and Manganelli 
(2019) for the euro area and Duprey and Ueberfeldt (2020) for Canada.
The authors also evaluate the time-varying distribution of GDP growth 
and find that parameter uncertainty around time-varying moments other 
than the mean are imprecisely estimated. While the standard deviation of 
GDP growth one quarter ahead clearly varies over time, and in line with 
the mean, the paper shows it has high parameter uncertainty around reces-
sion periods. The authors emphasize that the variance cannot be estimated 
precisely and the financial factor is not important. I would emphasize 
instead the finding that the GDP growth distribution is time-varying and 
that periods when uncertainty is higher—the recessions—are precisely the 
periods we care most about. Rather than concluding it is a futile exercise 
to estimate these periods, I think a more appropriate interpretation is that 
more work is needed to help predict these important events.
One extension could be to draw on research that distinguishes financial 
indicators by specific concepts they are intended to measure. To illustrate, 
Bernanke (2018) uses daily data on seventy-five financial variables and 
aggregates them to a monthly frequency to evaluate the effects of financial 
variables on mean GDP growth. Importantly, he splits the data to represent 
four groups, reflecting housing and mortgages, nonmortgage credit avail-
ability, short-term funding, and bank solvency. He finds the effects of the 
four factors vary significantly: panic factors (credit and funding) are sig-
nificant predictors of the means of monthly GDP, industrial production, the 
unemployment rate, and other variables, whereas the balance sheet factors 
are less significant. He does not test for variance, but the sample period 
contains only one recession.
Many papers that have studied the role of credit on large output losses 
in the future have incorporated credit cycles of many years because cycles 
can take a while to emerge. For example, Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 
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(2013) focus on credit growth since the trough of the last recession, and 
Kiley (2018), Aikman and others (2020), and Adrian and others (2018) use 
between eight and sixteen quarters to capture credit cycles. In a separate 
paper, Hasenzagl, Reichlin, and Ricco (2020) show that the leverage sub-
component can help to predict the variance of quarterly GDP growth, 
while the subcomponents for market and credit risk do not. This type of 
analysis is missing in this paper.
In a third stage of the analysis, the authors test the predictive value of 
individual financial variables for the distribution of GDP growth. They 
use data in FRED-QD and add some additional data. The data set for 
the United States has forty-three variables, of which fifteen are financial 
variables, a mix of quantity and price variables. The authors employ a 
conditional heteroskedasticity model for GDP growth and a method that 
selects the relevant predictor variables among a large set of variables 
using a “Bayesian prior distribution on the model parameters that imposes 
approximate sparsity.” Each of the variables are entered separately. They 
find that only a couple of financial variables can help to predict mean or 
variance, though perhaps this is not surprising given many of the variables 
are collinear and they are not grouped in any way.
What does this paper suggest for macroprudential policy? Macro-
prudential policies are designed to increase the resilience of the financial 
sector to negative shocks, to reduce amplification because disruptions in 
credit and funding can have serious repercussions for the real economy. 
Financial variables can help macroprudential policymakers for what they 
signal about possible buildups of financial vulnerabilities when financial 
conditions allow lenders and borrowers to increase risk taking by more 
than usual, which would make the financial system more vulnerable to 
negative shocks. Financial variables can also signal possible disruptions in 
market liquidity and credit supply which if sustained would increase risks 
to growth as borrowers lost access to credit.
The authors acknowledge that there is a role for macroprudential poli-
cies because financial vulnerabilities can amplify shocks. But their results 
aren’t directly applicable because they test the value of financial variables 
mainly as noisy predictors that are just a reflection of real activity, rather 
than an assessment of current and potential buildup of financial imbalances.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION   James Stock thanked the authors and discus-
sants for a great paper and informative discussion. He said he was sym-
pathetic to the challenge of having to make forecasts of not just GDP 
but also its moments using financial variables. He wondered why the 
authors’ results differed so much from those of Adrian, Boyarchenko, and 
Giannone.1 He asked whether the distinctions were due to differences in 
methods or indexes.
Lucrezia Reichlin pointed out she had recently used exactly the same 
data as Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone to test the performance of 
financial variables in out-of-sample forecasting in a paper together with 
Ricco and Hasenzagl.2 This paper found similarly negative results about 
the ability to forecast GDP using financial variables, so the difference could 
not be the data. Instead, the authors’ results differ substantially from those 
of Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone because of how the global and 
financial indexes are constructed, she said. Several financial indexes, like 
the Chicago Fed’s National Financial Conditions Index, are actually very 
correlated with real factors. This fact motivated the authors to construct a 
financial index that separates out all of the effect of real variables to answer 
the question: How much additional predictive power does the purely finan-
cial component of the movement in financial variables give you? As it turns 
out, the answer is not much.
Nevertheless, Reichlin agreed with Liang’s point that financial variables 
are very important for the business cycle. But much of that effect works 
endogenously through common factors captured by the authors’ global 
factors. Reichlin noted that the authors take a “brain-dead forecasters” 
approach, ignoring any structural mechanism relating financial and real 
variables, and focus purely on the usefulness of their financial factors for 
forecasting GDP and its moments. They would need to take a different, 
more structural, approach to get at the endogenous mechanisms driving the 
effect of financial variables on business cycles, Reichlin said.
Giovanni Ricco noted that both Liang and Gertler questioned whether 
it was possible to cleanly separate real and financial shocks in their discus-
sions. Ricco responded that their paper does not perform a fully structural 
exercise, and a structural model is needed to get at the mechanisms through 
1. Tobias Adrian, Nina Boyarchenko, and Domenico Giannone, “Vulnerable Growth,” 
American Economic Review 109, no. 4 (2019): 1263–89.
2. Lucrezia Reichlin, Giovanni Ricco, and Thomas Hasenzagl, “Financial Variables as 
Predictors of Real Growth Vulnerability,” Discussion Paper 05/2020 (Frankfurt: Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 2020), https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/827682/3deb1560a27f63fe 
08d2f60628eb7636/mL/2020-03-05-dkp-05-data.pdf.
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which financial and real variables interact. Having said that, the starting 
point of their paper was that movements in financial variables reflect some 
mixture of information about developments in the real economy and extra 
financial stresses. This motivated them to take the admittedly extreme 
approach of removing all of the global and real factors and to instead 
work with just the orthogonal financial component. This decision allowed 
them to analyze whether the financial component had additional predictive 
power. If so, this finding would provide strong reduced form evidence 
in favor of an additional financial frictions story. However, their results 
indicate that their index does not have much predictive power. Ricco noted 
that this result is not the end of the story. He noted that extending the 
analysis with more structural guidance is necessary for thinking about 
policy.
In response to Liang’s point that estimates of the standard deviation of 
GDP do move around over time, Ricco pointed out that while it is true 
that their point estimates move around, it is still possible to draw a flat 
straight line through their uncertainty band. While their paper shows that 
it is certainly true that financial variables have some predictive power for 
the variance of GDP, Ricco observed that overall the results on the second 
moment showed a very weak predictive relation.
